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The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) is often referred to as the biggest 
foreign policy success of the European Union (EU). It ended twelve years of tough 
negotiations, stabilising one of the most volatile regions of the world. The EU’s 
engagement with Iran was distinct from that of the United States or even that of its 
member states as it focused on promoting multilateralism and diplomatic dialogue, 
making the EU-Iran relationship of utmost importance for both parties involved. This 
paper seeks to answer the research question to what extent the EU possesses a foreign 
policy identity that is more than the sum of that of its member states and how it 
expressed this identity in its engagement with Iran. Exploring EU foreign policy identity 
is important because it explains what type of actor the EU is in the international system 
and sheds light on the decision-making process of its external action. The study argues 
that the EU has indeed an own distinct foreign policy identity which reflects its values 
such as a unique commitment to diplomatic dialogue and multilateralism as the 
solution to international problems as well as a guarantee to upholding the rule of law 
in the international system. Through a qualitative content analysis of the American, 
British and French press as well as expert interviews with EU officials and member states’ 
diplomats the existence and importance of a distinct brand of EU foreign policy 
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Introduction 
“A sign of hope for the entire world, very much needed in these times”.1 These are the 
words that the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy 
and Vice-President of the European Commission (HR/VP), Federica Mogherini, used to 
describe the agreement that the EU3+32 reached in Vienna on 14 July 2015. She was 
referring to the historical breakthrough in a twelve-year period of gruelling negotiations 
whereby the option of yet another military intervention in the Middle East was avoided 
and diplomacy triumphed. The position that the European Union (EU) had stood 
consistently by for twelve years paid off and the bloc now had a successful example 
of its distinct foreign policy. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) further 
institutionalised the EU’s role, naming the High Representative as the chair of the 
agreement’s Joint Commission and effectively making the EU responsible for the 
continued implementation of the deal.  
 
Since 2015 the JCPOA has become the flagship of EU foreign policy, bringing the 
European Union’s relationship with Iran to the front of the stage and making it a good 
case study for examining the EU’s foreign policy identity. This study analyses the EU’s 
expression of its foreign policy identity in the JCPOA and its relationship with the Islamic 
Republic of Iran. It will seek to answer the following research question: to what extent 
does the EU possess a foreign policy identity that is more than the sum of that of its 
member states and how has the EU expressed this identity in its engagement with Iran?  
 
Foreign policy identity is a debated concept in the literature. For the purpose of 
this paper, EU foreign policy identity is defined as “the collective EU cultural practices, 
norms and values which give expression to and shape its foreign policies and its 
relations with non-member countries”.3 Exploring EU foreign policy identity is important 
because it explains what type of actor the EU is in the international system and sheds 
light on the decision-making process of its external action. The paper argues that EU 
                                                 
1 F. Mogherini, EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, speech, 
“JCPOA signing press conference”, Vienna, 14 July 2015. 
2 France, Germany and the UK form the E3, the US, Russia and China are the three other 
members present in the negotiations. The formation is also alternatively referred to as the P5+1, 
the five permanent members of the UN Security Council and Germany. 
3 E. Johansson-Nogues, The Construction of an EU Foreign Policy Identity: Identitarian 
Resonance and Dissonance in the European Union’s Relations with the Mediterranean, 
Northern European and Western Balkan Borderlands, PhD thesis, Bellaterra, Universitat 
Autonoma de Barcelona, 2008. 
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foreign policy identity goes further than the sum of that of its member states because 
it reflects a unique commitment to diplomatic dialogue and multilateralism as the 
solution to international problems as well as a guarantee to upholding the rule of law 
in the international system.  
 
The paper begins with an overview of EU-Iran relations and a discussion of the 
specificities of the Iran file. It then examines the theoretical literature available on the 
concept of foreign policy identity. Finally, to assess EU foreign policy identity 
throughout the negotiations and conclusion of the agreement on Iran’s nuclear 
programme, the author has opted for a research methodology combining a 
qualitative and quantitative content analysis of the press as well as expert interviews 
with EU officials and member state diplomats.4 The press study examines three crucial 
moments in the EU’s engagement with Iran in the French, British and American press. 
The selected moments are the imposition of restrictive measures on Iran in December 
2006, the conclusion of the agreement in July 2015 and the United States’ (US) 
withdrawal from the accord in May 2018.  
 
EU-Iran relations 
At a first glance, the relationship between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the 
European Union might not seem very significant to foreign policy analysts, as Iran is not 
an important economic partner for the EU. However, the EU-Iran relationship has 
played an important role in the elaboration of the EU’s foreign policy. Not only has it 
allowed the EU to test all of its arsenal of foreign policy instruments, but also the bloc 
has had a sustained engagement with Iran since the 1990s, when the Common 
Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) started being developed. Thus, the EU-Iran 
relationship and the JCPOA have witnessed the ‘coming-of-age’ of the EU as a foreign 
policy actor, from the birth of the CFSP pillar in the Maastricht Treaty when it was a 
timid declaratory policy, to an innovative political dialogue in the late 1990s and finally 
to a comprehensive deal to curb Iran’s nuclear activities in 2015. 
 
EU engagement with Iran 
EU engagement began in the 1990s, when Iran emerged from its long, bloody war with 
Iraq and began to look for opportunities to rebuild. In 1992, the European Council 
                                                 
4 K. Krippendorff, Content Analysis: An Introduction to Its Methodology, 2nd edn, Thousand 
Oakes, Sage, 2004. 
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made the formal decision to reach out to Iran in its Edinburgh Conclusions.5 However, 
due to a number of issues between the ‘West’ and Iran at this time, the interaction was 
established as a ‘critical dialogue’.6  
 
The election of Khatami marked a true turn in EU-Iran relations as the new 
President showed willingness to compromise or at least to enter into dialogue on a 
series of subjects which the previous governments had refused to discuss, most notably 
human rights. The EU rewarded Tehran’s acts of good will by transforming its ‘critical’ 
dialogue with Iran into a ‘comprehensive’ one. The talks included negotiations on a 
Trade Cooperation Agreement.7 Many in Iran and in the EU hoped that this signalled 
the normalisation of relations between the two parties.  
 
However, in July 2002, the National Council of Resistance of Iran revealed that 
the Islamic Republic was enriching uranium in undeclared sites in Natanz and Fordow.8 
Shortly following the revelations, the foreign ministers of France, Germany and the UK 
travelled to Tehran to discuss the nuclear programme with their Iranian counterparts. 
Iran represented an opportunity for the burgeoning European foreign policy but also 
for the EU to mend divisions within its ranks following the invasion of Iraq by a US-led 
coalition in 2003. The issue of non-proliferation, however, was one that all member 
states agreed on and this gave the European Union the opportunity to demonstrate 
once more its commitment to dialogue and multilateralism.  
 
E3 engagement 
France, Germany and the UK formed a lead group on the question of Iran’s nuclear 
capabilities. At the beginning, their initiative was purely intergovernmental and certain 
aspects of this approach remained through the twelve years of negotiations; the file 
was not left to EU institutions and no other member states joined the delegation. 
However, as HR Javier Solana joined the initiative, the terms E3, EU3 and EU were used 
interchangeably.9 The media did not question the use of one terminology or the other 
                                                 
5 European Council, “Conclusions of the Presidency: Part D External Relations: Iran”, 
SN/456/1/92 REV 1, 1992, p. 96.  
6 M. Rubin, “Europe's Critical Dialogue with Iran: An Assessment”, Policy Watch Washington 
Institute, Washington, DC, January 2000.  
7 “EU/Iran Negotiations for Trade & Cooperation Agreement to restart on 12 January”, 
European Commission Press Release database, Brussels, 11 January 2005. 




and if they did, they assumed that the three countries acted as representatives for the 
Union. The E3’s interests in engaging with Iran converged in wanting to play a 
leadership role in international affairs to uphold the international non-proliferation 
regime. This in turn allowed the group to provide leadership on a position on the Iran 
nuclear file to which the other members rallied,10 while also managing to give a sense 
of ownership to the whole bloc by integrating the successive High Representatives into 
the process.  
 
EU interests 
The EU’s interests pertaining to Iran can be divided into four main categories.11 First, 
the EU seeks to maintain stability in the Persian Gulf region, which continues to be vitally 
important for global oil supplies and prices. Second, it seeks to resolve the conflicts in 
the Middle East, not least in order to prevent further refugee movements toward 
Europe in the wake of instability and failing states. Third, the EU wishes to diversify its 
energy supplies by increasing Iranian imports and reducing Europe’s significant energy 
dependence on Russia. Fourth, the EU wants to boost exports of its industrial goods by 
expanding economic relations with Iran at a time of weak European growth rates over 
the past decade. The uniqueness of the Iran question came from the convergence of 
EU interests with an international opportunity to get involved that the EU sought 
because of its division over Iraq.12  
 
The EU assessed its role, as stated by the Secretary General of the European 
External Action Service (EEAS) Helga Schmidt, a key figure present through the twelve 
years of negotiations and the succession of three High Representatives:  
Only the European Union could have played that role. No other actor would 
have been accepted. Russia, China and the US could not have done it, but also 
none of the EU Member States could have done it. It was only the EU that was 
accepted because the EU was perceived by both sides as a neutral actor, as a 
moderator, a facilitator. We were bridge builders in the context between Iran 
and the US, which continues to be difficult.13 
                                                 
10 Alcaro, op. cit., p. 23. 
11 C. Adebahr, Europe and Iran: The Nuclear Deal and Beyond, Abingdon, Routledge, 2018, p. 
41. 
12 Ibid. 
13 H. Schmidt cited in “Europe and Iran: Beyond the Nuclear Deal”, Carnegie Europe, 17 May 
2017, retrieved 16 April 2019, https://carnegieeurope.eu/2017/05/17/europe-and-iran-beyond-
nuclear-deal-event-5595 
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Thus, the relationship between the EU and Iran brought together particular conditions 
for the EU to exercise its newly born foreign policy in a united and coherent manner.  
 
Challenges and opportunities of EU engagement with Iran 
This section looks at the two main challenges which lie within the EU-Iran relationship, 
namely Iran’s human rights record and its regional interference. It also presents the 
opportunity that the JCPOA represented to institutionalise constructive dialogue 
between both actors. 
 
Human rights 
Since the adoption of the JCPOA and its implementation, the EU has always viewed 
the deal as a starting point for its relations with Iran. The US has criticised the EU for 
deciding to separate the nuclear issue from other issues such as regional questions or 
Iran’s human rights record. Since the emergence of the nuclear issue with Iran, non-
proliferation has been the EU’s utmost priority, which has somewhat side-lined human 
rights concerns. It is useful to examine this downgrading of human rights through the 
lens of Normative Power Europe.14 Ian Manners’ famous concept considers the EU’s 
power in the international system as its ability to define what is ‘normal’. To do so, the 
EU deploys a series of mechanisms such as the manipulation of interests, bargaining or 
persuasion. In the case of Iran, the norms that the EU seeks to promote are human 
rights and the rule of law, but also non-proliferation.15 Benjamin Kienzle argues that the 
mechanism the EU used to promote human rights was not compatible with the one 
used to promote non-proliferation. Indeed, on the question of human rights, the EU 
opted for persuasion with dialogues and a minimal level of pressure, whereas on the 
question of non-proliferation the EU used both sanctions and incentives to get Iran to 
abandon its military nuclear programme.16 Nonetheless, human rights remain one of 
the main challenges to the EU-Iran relationship today. The EU has managed to remain 
constant in recalling the human rights question on all levels of dialogue with Iran. 
 
  
                                                 
14 I. Manners, “Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?”, Journal of Common 
Market Studies, vol. 40, no. 2, 2002, pp. 235-258. 
15 B. Kienzle, “Between Human Rights and Non-Proliferation: Norm Competition in the EU’s Iran 





The regional question 
During the negotiations but also following the US withdrawal from the JCPOA in May 
2018, the question of Iran’s role in disrupting the stability of the region through its 
support to groups in Syria, Yemen or Iraq have been a point of contention between 
the EU and Iran. The EU’s analysis of the situation converges with that of the US; Iran’s 
destabilising actions must cease. However, the EU has chosen to separate this question 
from the nuclear file because it views the nuclear file as a question of non-proliferation, 
whilst it understands Iran’s regional actions as a policy which must be resolved by a 
regional dialogue. The EU has faced much criticism for separating its policies on Iran. 
This move is inscribed in what HR Mogherini calls the ‘dialogue of the 4Cs’: 
“comprehensive, cooperative, critical if needed and constructive always with Iran”.17 
Engaging Iran through the JCPOA establishes a reliable and institutional point of 
contact on which to build a bilateral relationship. 
 
Opportunities: the JCPOA’s institutional framework and trust building 
Following the signing of the plan of action in 2015, the EU has found itself endowed 
with a formal institutional role in dealings with Iran. Indeed, the EU and its HR/VP are 
the chair and coordinator of the JCPOA’s Joint Commission for monitoring the 
implementation of the deal.18 The Joint Commission meets regularly, thus creating an 
opportunity for trust building through regular contact between the signatories. 
Furthermore, the repeated declarations by the EU of its commitment to the JCPOA 
following the US withdrawal also strengthened the basis for cooperation between Iran 
and the EU. For this reason, the EU adopted a package of 50 million euros in 2018 for 
“sustainable economic development” in Iran with a “focus on assistance to the private 
sector”.19 This allocation ranges from development cooperation focused on 
environmental issues, to support to Iranian small and medium-sized enterprises and 
combating drug trafficking. It builds upon the EU’s commitment to facilitate Iran’s 
integration into the global economy and international system. This was also 
demonstrated right after the signing of the JCPOA, when HR/VP Mogherini visited 
                                                 
17 EEAS, “Mogherini leads Commission delegation to Iran: launches ’Dialogue of the 4 C’s’”, 16 
April 2015.  
18 S. Blockmans & A. Viaud, “EU diplomacy and the Iran nuclear deal: staying power?”, CEPS 
Policy Insights, no. 28, Brussels, 2017. 
19 European Commission, “European Commission adopts support package for Iran, with a focus 
on the private sector”, 23 August 2018. 
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Tehran accompanied by a delegation of seven Commissioners from Internal Market 
to Transport to Education and Culture.20  
 
The EU’s foreign policy identity 
Identity is a contested concept in foreign policy analysis. International Relations (IR) 
theorists do not all agree that identity is even a relevant variable in the decision-
making process of foreign policy, at least not at the same level as interests. Likewise, 
European or EU identity is an equally challenged notion, its very existence is the subject 
of much debate, let alone its relevance. For the purpose of this paper, EU foreign 
policy identity is defined as “the collective EU cultural practices, norms and values 
which give expression to and shape its foreign policies and its relations with non-
member countries”.21  
 
Keukeleire and Delreux define EU foreign policy as “the area of European policies 
that is directed at the external environment with the objective of influencing it and its 
actors to pursue interests, values and goals”.22 This definition provides a broader 
understanding of foreign policy beyond CFSP to the wider external action of the EU 
(such as its very active trade policy). External action is the area in which European 
integration has made some of its most dynamic moves in the last years with institutional 
innovations like the establishment of the HR/VP and the EEAS or the creation of EU 
military staff as well as the growing link and coordination between CFSP and exclusive 
competence areas.23  
 
In 1973, the foreign ministers of the nine member states at the time published a 
declaration on European identity for the purpose of conducting a more coherent 
foreign policy.24 In this document, the member states highlighted the necessity of 
defining European identity in order to better constitute the EU’s external action. The 
document mentions several important bilateral relationships for the EU such as that 
                                                 
20 J. Valero, “Commission embarks on business trip to Tehran, despite renewed sanctions”, 
Euractiv, 14 April 2016. 
21 Ibid. 
22 S. Keukeleire & T. Delreux, The Foreign Policy of the European Union, 2nd edn, Basingstoke, 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2014, p. 1. 
23 B. Tonra & T. Christiansen, “The Study of EU Foreign Policy: Between International Relations 
and European Studies”, SSRN Electronic Journal, 2011. 
24 “Declaration on European Identity (Copenhagen, 14 December 1973)”, Bulletin of the 
European Communities, December 1973, no. 12, Luxembourg, Office for Official Publications 
of the European Communities, pp. 118-122. 
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with China, the US or the African, Caribbean and Pacific countries. Its most interesting 
assessment, however, is its statement that  
European identity will evolve as a function of the dynamic construction of a 
United Europe. In their external relations, the Nine propose progressively to 
undertake the definition of their identity in relation to other countries or groups of 
countries. They believe that in so doing they will strengthen their own cohesion 
and contribute to the framing of a genuinely European foreign policy.25  
 
European identity comes as much from member states’ integration objectives as it 
does from their external ones.26 What is designated as foreign and external strengthens 
what is seen as native and internal. Moreover, conceptualising European identity as 
evolving and dynamic allows the concept to be used to answer to future challenges 
that may arise.  
 
The concept of identity entered IR theory with the development of the 
constructivist school of thought. Its key tenets are that knowledge, and thus reality, is 
historically and socially constructed. Constructivism holds that core concepts like 
power capabilities and threats are actually defined by social interaction, perception 
and shared ideas.27 Its scholars also became increasingly interested in integrating the 
concept of collective identities into the study of the international system. Alexander 
Wendt’s seminal article ‘Collective Identity Formation and the International State’ 
argued that identities constitute interests. He defines collective identities as “in part 
particularistic identities of its members and the relations between them and in part a 
degree of social structure and actors external to the collective”.28 Collective identities 
“express a sense of belonging to a distinct group, they provide a system of orientation 
for self-reference and action”.29 Thus, what is foreign to the group and how said group 
interacts with it has an importance in defining the identity of the group itself. As 
Johansson-Nogues argues, the constructivist approach “allows us to contemplate the 
                                                 
25 Ibid. 
26 Keukeleire & Delreux, op. cit., p. 35. 
27 R. Jackson & G. Sørensen, Introduction to International Relations: Theories and Approaches, 
Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2010, 4th edn, p. 166. 
28 A. Wendt, “Collective Identity Formation and the International State”, The American Political 
Science Review, vol. 88, no. 2, 1994, pp. 384-396. 
29 L. Aggestam, “Role Identity and the Europeanisation of Foreign Policy: A Political-Cultural 
Approach”, in B. Tora & T. Christiansen (eds), Rethinking European Union Foreign Policy, 
Manchester, Manchester University Press, 2004, p. 82. 
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possibility that a collective such as the EU may have an ‘identity’ separable albeit not 
separate from its member states even if it is not a full-fledged political community”.30 
 
Discourse analysis does not seek to explain EU foreign policy but instead to 
demonstrate the means through which it is being discursively constructed.31 This 
constitutes an added value for assessing EU foreign policy identity because it allows us 
to study evolutions in its discursive construction as a result of events happening at the 
time. Moreover, values have an important role in discourse analysis, not in a normative 
manner but rather as a unit of analysis in discursive practices. In its relations with third 
countries, the EU uses certain values to position itself vis-à-vis others. Recurrent values 
in EU foreign policy, both stated by the EU itself and in third-country perceptions of the 
EU are: liberal democracy and the rule of law, free trade and liberalisation and the 
peaceful resolution of disputes.  
 
Having set the theoretical and historical contexts of the EU-Iran relationship, the 
next section explores it specifically in relation to the Iran nuclear deal. 
 
Case study: EU foreign policy identity in the Iran nuclear deal 
The following section draws on a qualitative and quantitative content analysis of the 
press to gauge EU foreign policy identity in the negotiations on the Iran nuclear 
programme.32 Written press coverage is representative of both civil societies’ and 
governments’ positions on foreign policy. As Cook states, the media generally support 
their government’s position on foreign policy even in democratic societies with free 
press.33 The written press is also a good indicator for foreign policy identity because it 
uses frames in its reporting of events. In line with discourse analysis, in the media, frames 
help people to “locate, perceive, identify, and label” the events with regards to what 
they already know.34 By studying the framing and recurrent concepts used by the 
press, it is possible to gain a relevant appraisal of EU foreign policy identity.  
                                                 
30 Johansson-Nogues, op. cit. 
31 S. Aydın-Düzgit, “Unravelling European Union Foreign Policy through Critical Discourse 
Analysis: Guidelines for Research”, in J.-F. Morin, & C. Carta (eds), EU Foreign Policy Through the 
Lens of Discourse Analysis: Making Sense of Diversity, Abingdon, Routledge, 2014, p. 133. 
32 J. Ritchie & J. Lewis, Qualitative Research Practice: A Guide for Social Science Students and 
Researchers, London, Sage, 2003. 
33 T. Cook, Governing with the News: The News Media as a Public Institution, Chicago, IL, The 
University of Chicago Press, 2005. 
34 M. Linström & W. Marais, “Qualitative News Framing Analysis: A Methodology”, Communitas, 
vol. 17, 2012, pp. 21-38. 
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To achieve a representative press study from which trends in EU foreign policy 
can be deduced, the author has decided to sample three newspapers from France, 
the United Kingdom and the United States; respectively Le Monde, The Financial Times 
and The New York Times. France and the United Kingdom were chosen for their 
membership of the E3 lead group which held a crucial role in the negotiations on the 
Iran nuclear programme from its very beginning in 2003. The United States serves as a 
point of reference to assess the perception of EU foreign policy identity from the point 
of view of a third party.  
 
The sample of studied articles have been selected from three specific moments 
over the twelve-year period of negotiations. For each moment, all articles about Iran 
generally and its nuclear programme more specifically were reviewed over a period 
of two weeks. The criteria for the search strategy did not include stories about nuclear 
non-proliferation but more generally stories about Iran. Thus, the sample captured 
reports about Iran which were not directly related to its nuclear programme or the 
negotiations. The articles were taken from the daily printed paper version of the 
newspaper so as to ensure a comparable sample for the three newspapers.  
 
The first moment is the week before and the week after 23 December 2006, when 
the United Nations (UN) adopted resolution 1737 imposing economic sanctions on Iran 
for its non-compliance with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of 
1970 of which it is a signatory.35 This moment was chosen because in 2006 the public 
had known about Iran’s nuclear programme for three years and the press coverage 
of the UN sanctions would be less impassioned. Furthermore, the EU’s original position 
which sought dialogue at all costs with the Islamic Republic had failed and the 
Europeans aligned their position with that of the Americans. The importance of this 
turning point in EU policy towards Iran makes it an interesting event to study.  
 
The second moment selected for the press study was the week before and after 
14 July 2015, the date on which the JCPOA was adopted in Vienna.36 This moment 
was selected because of its importance as the culmination of the twelve years of 
negotiations on Iran’s nuclear programme. It was publicised by both the EU and the 
                                                 
35 United Nations, “S/RES/1737 UN Security Council Resolution 1737: Non-proliferation”, 
UNdocs.org, 2006. 
36 EEAS, “Iran Deal reached in Vienna”, 14 July 2015. 
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E3 as a historic moment proving the success of diplomacy and multilateralism. It also 
serves as an engaging contrast to the EU position in 2006.  
 
Finally, the last sample studied is US President Trump’s decision to withdraw from 
the JCPOA on 8 May 2018. This final moment was chosen because of the breakdown 
it signifies in the transatlantic partnership. The E3 lobbied the Trump administration up 
to the week before his announcement for the US to remain in the JCPOA. Hence, it is 
a testing moment for EU values such as effective multilateralism. The EU’s perception 
of itself as an influential actor in the international system was also called into question. 
Table 1 shows the number of articles about Iran during the three selected time periods.  
 
Table 1 Number of articles on Iran 














27 8 8 43 
JCPOA signing  
July 2015 
8 July 2015 22 July 
2015 45 18 16 79 
US withdrawal 





2018 32 15 18 65 
Total    104 41 42 187 
 
Following content analysis methodology,37 the sample was analysed using a coding 
framework that sought to capture the presence of the following variables: 
- Whether or not the EU appeared in headlines; 
- Whether or not the EU was mentioned in the body of the text; 
- Whether EU/E3 member states were mentioned as actors independent of the Union 
and the lead group; 
- Whether the US was mentioned as the main actor; 
- Whether Iranian domestic affairs were the main angle of the article; 
- Whether the UN was cited as the main actor or arena for the issue to be resolved; 
- Whether regional issues were the main angle of the article (the concrete regional 
issues varied depending on the moment, Iraq was the main regional issue in 2006, 
the Islamic State and the war in Syria in 2015 and Israel in 2018); 
                                                 
37 W. Neuman, M. Just & A. Crigler, Common Knowledge: News and the Construction of Political 
Meaning, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1992,  pp. 75-82.  
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- Whether the economic aspects of the issue was the main angle of the article; 
- Whether the article included a photography; 
- Who was the main personality of the article and which names were recurrent;  
- Whether the article was on the front page.  
 
The variables above were chosen for the quantitative and qualitative nature of 
the data they provided. Quantitative data was taken from the saliency of variables in 
the sample. Qualitative data was deduced from the tone and framing of the 
variables. The studied sample was coded manually by the author to reveal the 
presence of the variables. The content of the articles was also examined for its 
illustrations and its discussants. This was carried out to see what was portrayed as 
relevant and who was given a voice.  
 
As a complement and a contrast to the newspaper analysis, the author 
conducted a few expert interviews with EU officials in a variety of institutions, national 
diplomats working at the Permanent Representations to the EU and the Brussels 
correspondent for The New York Times. Interviews are a good way of gathering 
qualitative data for research because they allow the researcher to gauge the manner 
in which the interviewee is responding and the sentiment he or she expresses. 
Furthermore, interviews allowed to follow additional leads, for example the 
development cooperation initiatives between the EU and Iran that did not come up 
in the press study. The research data gathered from these interviews were used to 
compare the expression of EU foreign policy identity revealed by the newspaper 
analysis with the sentiment of EU foreign policy-makers. The same interview guide was 
used as the starting point for all expert interviews but as the research was qualitative 
in nature, the questions asked were slightly modified to better fit the position of the 
interviewee.38  
 
Press study findings  
Table 2 shows the prevalence and location of stories on Iran in the studied press. 
  
                                                 
38 S. Kvale, InterViews: An Introduction to Qualitative Research Interviewing, Thousand Oaks, 
CA, Sage, 1994. pp. 8-10. 
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Table 2 Number of front-page stories on Iran 
 New York Times Financial Times Le Monde 
2006 4 2 1 
2015 11 1 2 
2018 7 2 4 
Total 22 4 8 
Placing an article on the front page demonstrates the prioritisation of the subject 
matter for the editor and reflects the discussion in the political spheres.  
The following table looks at the presence of photographic illustration with the articles 
on Iran. 
Table 3 Number of articles with pictures 
 New York Times Financial Times Le Monde Total 
UN sanctions 
December 2006 
0 1 0 1 
JCPOA signing  
July 2015 
5 6 2 13 
US withdrawal from 
JCPOA May 2008 
5 5 3 13 
Total 10 12 5 27 
 
(1) The UN sanctions of December 2006 
In the sample of articles studied between 16-30 December 2006, the variables coded 
appeared as listed in Table 4 below.  






Le Monde Total 
EU in headlines 0 0 1 1 
EU in text 1 0 1 2 
EU/E3 member states 
mentioned separately 
2 2 1 5 
US 10 0 0 10 
Iran domestic affairs  7 4 3 14 
UN 9 1 4 14 
Regional issues 8 0 1 9 




The data from the studied sample reveals general disregard for the issue of UN 
sanction on Iran within the European press. Both the Financial Times and Le Monde 
published eight articles on Iran (see Table 1). The EU makes it into the headlines in 
relation to Iran only once, in Le Monde, indirectly, not as an actor in its own right but 
instead as an arena for Iran to use to bypass the US.39 The Financial Times does not 
even mention the EU in its text, focusing instead on specific member states such as 
France’s40 or the United Kingdom’s41 relations with Iran.  
 
The Financial Times’ main focus in the studied sample is on domestic affairs and 
more specifically the advance of reformist factions which oppose the hardliner 
President Ahmadinejad in the municipal elections. Half of the British newspaper’s 
articles are about this subject.42 For Le Monde, the nuclear programme is the main 
focus of six articles out of the eight sampled during the timeframe. However, the EU is 
overshadowed by the UN which is presented as the main actor and decision-maker. 
The EU imposed restrictive measures on Iran in 2006 as a consequence of the UN 
Security Council resolution and within the UN’s framework. The economic aspect of 
the sanctions and Iran’s isolation in the international system is also a recurrent subject 
for the European newspapers. The Financial Times devotes an article to the sanctions 
faced by Total, the French oil company, for engaging in business with Iran, as well as 
an article on the consequences of the sanctions on Iran’s oil industry. In Le Monde the 
only mention of the EU appears in an article about the Iranian government’s effort to 
replace the dollar by the euro as its currency of choice of international transactions.43 
 
Across the Atlantic, the New York Times frames its articles on Iran quite differently. 
The American newspaper published practically three times as many articles as its 
European counterparts on Iran in the studied period. As with the Financial Times, 
                                                 
39 “L'Iran souhaite abandonner le dollar et choisir l'euro pour ses transactions internationales”, 
Le Monde, 18 December 2006, p. 1. 
40 M. Arnold, “Total faces investigation over $2bn Iran contract”, Financial Times, 20 December 
2006, p. 21. 
41 “Iran summons UK ambassador”, Financial Times, 27 December 2006, p. 4. 
42 G. Smyth & N. Bozorgmehr, “Ahmadi-Nejad seeks scent of triumph”, Financial Times, 16 
December 2006, p. 7; G. Smyth & N. Bozorgmehr, “Ahmadi-Nejad suffers setback in Iran 
elections”, Financial Times, 18 December 2006, p. 8; “Theocratic democracy: Iran’s 
unpredictable voters reveal Ahmadi-Nejad’s feet of day”, Financial Times, 19 December 2006, 
p. 18; G. Smyth, “Iran’s election likely to bring rethink at the top”, Financial Times, 19 December 
2006, p. 13. 
43 “L'Iran souhaite abandonner le dollar et choisir l'euro pour ses transactions internationales”, 
Le Monde, 18 December 2006, p. 6. 
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Iranian domestic politics and the municipal elections play an important role in the 
American newspaper’s coverage. However, the New York Times’ main angle is a 
reflection of American political concerns at the time, namely domestic sentiment on 
the war in Iraq. Eight articles mention Iran’s Arab neighbour. The discussion of a 
possible military intervention in Iran is also a reflection of American interventionist 
policies in the region. It is noteworthy that the coverage does not have any references 
to Israel at this point. Nevertheless, as with the European press and despite the New 
York Times generally framing the US as the main actor on the issue, the UN is given 
significant actorness on the question of the Iranian nuclear programme.44  
 
(2) JCPOA signing July 2015 
Figure 1 shows the distribution of cover stories in the sample of the time period 8-22 July 
2015 with a peak in mid-July when the JCPOA was signed. 
 
Figure 1 Distribution of cover stories across the sample (July 2015) 
 
 
In this sample of articles, the variables coded appeared as listed in Table 5 below.  
 
  
                                                 
44 E. Gootman, “Security Council Approves Sanctions Against Iran Over Nuclear Program”, New 
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Table 5 Number of articles in which each variable was present 
 
New York Times Financial Times Le Monde Total 
EU in headlines 0 0 1 1 
EU in text 2 4 2 6 
EU/E3 member states 
mentioned separately 
2 0 2 4 
US  11 8 2 21 
Iran domestic affairs  7 3 4 14 
UN 5 2 4 11 
Regional issues 4 7 5 16 
Economy 2 11 4 17 
 
On 15 July 2015, after twelve years of negotiations between Iran and the West, the 
JCPOA was signed in Vienna. In essence, the agreement lifted UN nuclear-related 
sanctions on Iran in exchange for the country halting its uranium enrichment and 
allowing International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors to visit nuclear power plants. 
The final round of negotiations that led to the conclusion of the JCPOA in 2015 began 
in 2013 with the interim Joint Plan of Action.45 This two-year period allowed the 
negotiations to become mediatised which explains in part the high number of articles 
in the studied sample for 2015. In the two-week period sampled, the Financial Times 
published 18 articles on Iran whilst Le Monde published 16 (see Table 1). The 
significance of these stories to the European press is shown also by the location of the 
stories in the issues as well as the increasing inclusion of pictures alongside the articles. 
The nuclear programme and possible deal is the most important subject of articles for 
the European press. Only one of Le Monde’s 16 articles is on Iran’s role in fighting the 
Islamic State in Iraq,46 while the rest of the sample is about the negotiations, conclusion 
and aftermath of the deal. The same trend is also visible in the Financial Times, where 
the main subject of every one of the 18 articles sampled is the JCPOA. This focus on 
the JCPOA within the European press shows the significance of the international 
agreement. However, the role of the EU is still omitted in the press coverage. The 
signatories of the JCPOA are referred to in all three newspapers as the P5+1 instead of 
the EU3+3 designation preferred by EU official communications.  
 
Moreover, the EU appears only in one headline in the European press, in Le 
Monde. The French newspaper notes the EU’s decision to delay the lifting of restrictive 
                                                 
45 K. Davenport, “Implementation of the Joint Plan of Action at a Glance”, Arms Control 
Association, October 2015.  
46 H. Sallon, “En Irak, Iran et Etats-Unis alliés malgré eux face à l’EI”, Le Monde, 16 July 2015.  
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measures on Iran by six months after the deal was signed.47 Although the Financial 
Times does not mention the EU in any of its headlines about the JCPOA, it includes 
more references to the EU in its text. These are generally associated to the economic 
power of the EU and the opportunity that the Iranian market offers European 
companies as it joins the global economy once the sanctions are lifted.48 Even in the 
European press, the success of the deal is mainly attributed to the US President, Barack 
Obama.49 The Financial Times cites Iranian President Hassan Rouhani on this subject. 
Rouhani had resumed his strategy as focusing on the “village chief” [the US] instead 
of “lower ranking figures” [the EU].50 This sentiment that the US was needed for the deal 
to take place is present in the press coverage of the three studied newspapers, 
discrediting the work EU foreign policy put into the negotiations before the US joined. 
 
In the New York Times’ coverage too, Obama and his Secretary of State, John 
Kerry, are credited with the success of the deal.51 It is referred to as the “biggest 
achievement of his [Obama’s] presidency”.52 However, the American newspaper 
focuses its reporting on the challenges ahead, with strong opposition domestically in 
Congress53 but also regionally with the US’ partners in the Middle East.54 With regards 
to the EU, the New York Times still does not consider the bloc to be a main actor in the 
negotiations and conclusion of the deal but references to the EU are increasingly 
present in the articles. The HR/VP Federica Mogherini is even pictured in an article 
about the negotiations.55  
The photographic content of the 2015 sample does not vary much across the 
three newspapers. Photos of the JCPOA negotiating teams during the negotiations 
                                                 
47 “L’Union européenne prolonge de six mois le gel des sanctions contre l’Iran”, Le Monde, 14 
July 2015.  
48 A. Sharman, “Carmarkers jostle for pole position as race for Iran begins”, Financial Times, 16 
July 2015, p. 19. 
49 “Editorial: Iran, un accord prometteur”, Le Monde, 15 July 2015; D. Sevastopulo & G. Dyer, 
“Obama gambles of ending years of bad blood”, Financial Times, 15 July 2015, p. 2. 
50 N. Bozorgmehr, “Agreement vindicates Rouhani’s focus on the ‘village chief’”, Financial 
Times, 15 July 2015, p. 2. 
51 D. Sanger, “Obama’s leap of faith on Iran”, New York Times, 14 July 2015, p. A1. 
52 M. Gordon & D. Sanger, “Deal Reached on Iran Nuclear Program; Limits on Fuel Would Lessen 
With Time”, New York Times, 14 July 2015, p. A1. 
53 J. Steinhauer & J. Weisman, “White House Lobbying Democrats and Independents to Support 
Iran Nuclear Deal”, New York Times, 15 July 2015, p. A12. 
54 I. Kershner, “Iran Deal Denounced by Netanyahu as ʻHistoric Mistakeʼ”, New York Times, 15 
July 2015, p. A11. 
55 M. R. Gordon & D. Sanger “Talks on Iran Nuclear Deal Are Extended Once Again”, New York 
Times, 8 July 2015, p. A 3. 
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and presenting the deal at the final press conference are present in all three 
periodicals. The New York Times and the Financial Times focus these images on John 
Kerry whilst Le Monde focuses on Federica Mogherini.  
Another recurring image is that of the Iranian youth celebrating in the streets of 
Tehran following the announcement of the deal. All three newspapers include images 
of these celebrations in their 15 July issue, the day after the announcement of the deal, 
demonstrating their desire to bring attention to the people of Iran who were set to gain 
a lot from the end of the country’s international isolation. 
 
(3) US withdrawal from JCPOA May 2018 
In the sample of articles studied between 1-16 May 2018, the variables coded 
appeared as listed in Table 6 below.  
Table 6 Number of articles in which each variable was present 
 
New York Times Financial Times Le Monde Total 
EU in headlines 2 4 2 8 
EU in text 7 9 8 24 
EU/E3 member states 
mentioned separately 
2 2 4 8 
US 14 1 5 20 
Iran domestic affairs  2 1 1 4 
UN 2 0 1 3 
Regional issues  10 2 4 16 
Economy 2 4 3 9 
 
On 8 May 2018, Donald Trump fulfilled his 2016 campaign promise and withdrew the 
US from the JCPOA,56 even though IAEA reports from July 2015 to May 2018 had 
continuously confirmed than Iran was abiding with its commitments.57 Trump not only 
withdrew from the JCPOA, he also announced the re-imposition of previous sanctions 
on the Islamic Republic as well as the addition of new, harsher sanctions.58 EU leaders 
had been lobbying the American President to remain in the accord and French 
                                                 
56 “Remarks by President Trump on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action”, White House. Gov, 
8 May 2018. 
57 F. Murphy, “Iran still holding up its end of nuclear deal, IAEA report shows”, Reuters, 22 
February 2019, retrieved 10 April, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-nuclear-iaea/iran-
still-holding-up-its-end-of-nuclear-deal-iaea-report-shows-idUSKCN1QB1XC 
58 K. Breuninger, “Here are the sanctions that will snap back into place now that Trump has 
pulled the US out of the Iran nuclear deal”, CNBC, 8 May 2018. 
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President Emmanuel Macron even addressed the US Congress on this subject.59 In the 
two-week period sampled between 1-16 May 2018, the Financial Times published 15 
articles on Iran and Le Monde published 18, four of which made it to the front page 
(see Table 1).  
 
Divergences between the EU and the US on Iran became increasingly 
mediatised, leading to the EU being referred to as an actor in its own right. On 11 May 
2018, the Financial Times publishes the article “How Europe should react to Trump”,60 
in which the journalist highlights the ineffectiveness of European leaders in convincing 
Trump through appeasement and calls for the EU to stand by its own foreign policy. Le 
Monde also follows this line of argument in its article “L’Europe doit convaincre l’Iran 
de rester dans l’accord”, which underlines once more European actorness and 
opportunity for leadership on the survival of the JCPOA.61 The EU is portrayed in both 
European newspapers as an alternative to Trump and American foreign policy more 
generally. The coverage of how individual member states will be affected by the US 
withdrawal and re-imposition of sanctions is treated with an EU angle. For instance, Le 
Monde dedicates an article to an overview of trade relations between France and 
Iran62 which includes the discussion of EU options in the aftermath of the US extra-
territorial sanctions. The Financial Times also focuses on the effect of US withdrawal on 
European companies and looks to the EU for the answer. 
 
Even the New York Times includes the EU in its headlines twice. However, the 
American perspective focuses less on the opportunity for EU leadership and more on 
the blow to the transatlantic relationship. Its Brussels correspondent Steven Erlanger 
titles his article “Europe, Again Humiliated by Trump, Struggles to Defend Its Interests” 
the day following the US announcement.63 Although the New York Times takes a 
stance against Trump’s action in its editorial of 9 May titled “Where’s that Better 
                                                 
59 J. Oliphant & M. Pennetier, “France's Macron visits Trump as Iran nuclear deal hangs in 
balance”, 23 April 2018, retrieved 10 April, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-
france/frances-macron-visits-trump-as-iran-nuclear-deal-hangs-in-balance-idUSKBN1HU0E9 
60 P. Stephens, “How Europe should react to Trump”, Financial Times, 11 May 2018, p. 5. 
61 R. Malley, “L’Europe doit convaincre l’Iran de rester dans l’accord”, Le Monde, 9 May 2018, 
p. 8. 
62 C. Chazal, “Quelles sont les relations commerciales entre la France et l’Iran ?”, Le Monde, 9 
May 2018, p. 10. 
63 S. Erlanger, “Europe, Again Humiliated by Trump, Struggles to Defend Its Interests”, New York 
Times, 9 May 2018, p. A1. 
Leah McCloskey-Gholikhany 
23 
Deal?”,64 the American newspaper’s coverage shows little interest or hope in an EU 
position to counter Trump. Instead, the New York Times reporting focuses on US 
domestic politics such as the influence of the pro-Israel lobby American Israel Public 
Affairs Committee65 or Trump’s personal distaste for John Kerry, lead negotiator of the 
JCPOA.66  
 
Trends across the three studied moments 
By comparing the three moments, this study revealed an evolution in the perception 
of the EU as a foreign policy actor on the issue of Iran’s nuclear programme. In 2006, 
the EU was not considered as a relevant player and is hardly mentioned by the three 
newspapers. The UN was the main reference both for setting the rules and for going 
ahead despite the EU having been involved in the negotiations longer. Non-
proliferation was listed as a priority for EU foreign policy but as working within the UN 
framework, as stated in Article 3(5) TEU. In 2015, the success of the nuclear deal 
negotiations was largely attributed to the US. Yet, the EU was mentioned as an arena 
but also as a relevant actor. For example, Federica Mogherini was quoted for the first 
time in this sample and her position as High Representative was thus legitimised. Finally, 
in 2018, the EU was portrayed as an alternative to the US’ foreign policy and as the 
only agent in the international system able to keep the JCPOA alive after the 
American withdrawal. Whether or not the EU can fulfil this role is not as important as 
the fact that it was seen as having the capabilities to do so in the media. The evolution 
of the Iran nuclear programme witnessed the ‘coming of age of EU foreign policy’67.  
 
The newspaper analysis also sheds light on the perception of the EU. For instance, 
the EU is often associated to economic concerns in the press study, either in articles 
about the commercial opportunities of a normalisation of relations with Iran or about 
the effect of EU restrictive measures on Iran. The economic weight of the EU in the 
international system gives it credibility and relevance in international affairs.68 When 
negotiating with a country isolated from the international system such as Iran, the 
                                                 
64 “Where’s That Better Deal?”, New York Times, 9 May 2018, p. A26. 
65 “Netanyahu’s Flimflam on Iran”, New York Times, 2 May 2018, p. A24. 
66 L. Qiu, “Trump Takes Aim at Kerry — Again — Ahead of Announcement on Iran Deal”, New 
York Times, 8 May 2018, p. A6. 
67 C. Adebahr, Europe and Iran: The Nuclear Deal and Beyond, Abingdon, Routledge, 2019, p. 
3. 
68 C. Damro, “Market Power Europe”, Journal of European Public Policy, vol. 19, no. 5, 2012, pp. 
682-699.   
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commercial opportunities the EU can offer makes it a welcome partner. Furthermore, 
in the 2018 moment the media’s view of the EU matches its perception of itself as it is 
most associated with the maintenance of a rule-based international order by 
upholding the JCPOA. Preserving the international legal regime is stated as one of the 
EU’s foreign policy objectives in Article 21 TEU and is a crucial element of the Union’s 
foreign policy identity. This is perhaps the most significant aspect of the JCPOA for EU 
foreign policy identity: it allows the EU to assert its foreign policy values. The EU strove 
to uphold the international legal regime throughout the entirety of its twelve-year 
engagement with Iran on the nuclear issue. Indeed, promoting non-proliferation and 
the NPT is also part of the norms which govern and regulate the international system. 
As is the EU’s continued preference for engaging Iran multilaterally and privileging a 
diplomatic approach over any other options. 
 
Expert interviews 
The expert interviews confirmed the trends revealed by the newspaper analysis such 
as the EU’s increasing importance throughout the process. They add to the study 
because they go further by explaining factors that contribute to the formation of EU 
foreign policy identity in the Iran nuclear negotiations and the subsequent agreement.  
 
A recurrent comment during all the interviews conducted was how little the EU 
role in the process which culminated in the JCPOA had to do with Iran itself. EU officials 
and Permanent Representation diplomats viewed the EU’s foreign policy identity 
regarding the nuclear dossier as resulting from the EU’s values or its place in the 
international system rather than from the EU-Iran bilateral relationship. This meant that 
Iran’s different cultural system and its identity as an Islamic Republic had little 
incidence on the EU’s position. It also meant that there was something intrinsically 
European about the EU’s way of doing foreign policy that could not be justified by this 
particular relationship with Iran. The interviewees overall agreed that this was due to 
the EU’s attachment to certain values. These values − multilateralism, proclivity for 
diplomatic solutions or upholding the rule of law − are the result of the European 
experience of integration.  
 
Moreover, interviewees often used the US and its policy towards Iran as a point 
of reference for assessing EU policy towards the Islamic Republic. Although the press 
study demonstrates that Iran is a more mediatised subject in the US, the EU is more 
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affected by issues in Iran because of its geographical proximity. Unlike many of the 
other states in the Middle East, Iran is not a member of the European Neighbourhood 
Policy but, as one EU official stated, “Iran is the neighbour of our neighbours”.69 Iranian 
affairs can thus have direct consequences on the EU. For example, armed conflict in 
the Middle East creates migration flows towards Europe. Thus, interviewed EU officials 
explained the prioritisation of engaging Iran as a security concern. Evidently, the 
nuclear capability of a ‘rogue state’ is a security concern for the entirety of the 
international system but Iran’s geographic proximity with Europe strongly taints the EU’s 
policy towards it. Unlike the US, the EU prioritises stability over regime change. In recent 
years, stability in the Middle East has become a priority for the EU across multiple policy 
areas and most notably migration, making the security component an important one 
in EU foreign policy identity.  
 
Interviewees agreed that the specificity of EU engagement with Iran on the 
nuclear programme is a strong example of EU values. The EU’s engagement began 
with a desire to promote multilateralism and diplomatic solutions in 2003, in a context 
where the US was leading a military intervention in Iraq. This commitment to 
multilateralism and diplomatic solutions remained relevant following the US withdrawal 
of the JCPOA in May 2018. The EU pledged its support to the deal immediately after 
the US withdrew and has stood firmly by it ever since, explicitly citing its belief in 
multilateralism.70  
 
Moreover, throughout the process, the EU has remained open to dialogue with 
Iran, even when it imposed restrictive measures on the country. Since the JCPOA was 
signed in 2015, the EU has sought to open new avenues for dialogue with Iran because 
it believes that confidence building between the two parties is the key to changing 
Iran’s behaviour regarding regional actions or its dire human rights record.71 This belief 
is the reason why since the implementation of the JCPOA, the EU has allocated 50 
million euros in bilateral cooperation to Iran, despite the country being a middle-
income country.72 Today, the EU seeks to expand cooperation with Iran in other sectors 
                                                 
69 Interview with an official, EEAS, Brussels, 2 April 2019. 
70 Joint statement by High Representative Federica Mogherini and Foreign Ministers Jean-Yves 
Le Drian, Heiko Maas and Jeremy Hunt, and Finance Ministers Bruno Le Maire, Olaf Scholz and 
Philip Hammond, Brussels, 2 November 2018.  
71 Interview with an official, DG DEVCO, European Commission, via telephone, 5 April 2019. 
72 “European Commission adopts support package for Iran, with a focus on the private sector”, 
International Cooperation and Development, 23 August 2018, retrieved 10 April, 
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such environmental policy or combating the drug routes from Afghanistan with transit 
through Iran to Europe.73 In this approach, the JCPOA was the first step in engaging 
Iran. Separating the nuclear agenda from the other issues allowed the EU to address 
the most urgent of its concerns with Iran and reach a multilateral deal. The EU’s 
commitment to this order has been put to the test by the US withdrawal but as the 
launch of the Instrument in Support of Trade Exchanges (INSTEX) and the activation of 
the blocking statute prove, the EU is seeking to prepare itself for independence from 
the American system.74 
 
A final noteworthy element on EU foreign policy identity vis-à-vis Iran’s nuclear 
programme is that the bloc has benefited from great unity within its ranks. As CFSP 
decisions are to be taken unanimously, unity is very important for having an effective 
EU foreign policy. For the JCPOA, the strong EU values which the accord represented 
were conducive to EU unity on the subject. Non-proliferation is a norm that is agreed 
upon by all member states and often referred to as an EU foreign policy objective.  
 
Obtaining Iran’s curtailment of its uranium-enriching activities through a 
multilateral accord was a significant success for a relatively young European 
diplomacy. The EU’s role was further enshrined in the HR/VP’s role as chair of the 
JCPOA Joint Commission and the role of the EEAS in supporting her.75 Furthermore, the 
UN framework and the existence of the IAEA as a point of referral and reference for 
the negotiation further reinforced the EU’s unity. The EU welcomes the legitimacy it 
gets from working alongside the UN. The combination of all these elements led the EU 
to benefit from an exceptional level of unity in its engagement with Iran on its nuclear 
programme. This in turn allowed the EU to formulate a clear, coherent and consistent 
policy which even in the face of the US withdrawal from the JCPOA has remained 
unwavering.  
 
                                                 
https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/news-and-events/european-commission-adopts-support-
package-iran-focus-private-sector_en 
73 Interview with Sean Kelly, MEP member of the European Parliament’s Delegation on Iran, via 
telephone, 9 April 2019. 
74 Ibid. 





This paper has sought to answer the question to what extent the EU possesses a foreign 
policy identity that is more than the sum of that of its member states and how it 
expressed this identity in its engagement with Iran. The analysis of the international 
press as well as the expert interviews showed that the EU has a distinct foreign policy 
identity when it comes to its engagement with Iran and its role in the JCPOA. The EU 
expresses a strong commitment to multilateralism and diplomatic dialogue vis-à-vis 
Iran that the US or even the EU member states taken individually do not. This approach 
to engaging Iran diplomatically was consistent in EU foreign policy throughout the 
twelve years of negotiations on the JCPOA but also since its implementation. The EU 
has continued to seek dialogue through any possible area of cooperation.  
 
This study has drawn on theoretical concepts from International Relations and 
discourse analysis to create an analytical framework to demonstrate this argument. It 
has shown that the notion of foreign policy identity is relevant to EU foreign policy 
analysis in the JCPOA. The data gathered through the newspaper analysis and the 
expert interviews has further corroborated the existence of a distinct brand of EU 
foreign policy. The place of values has been highlighted in the EU’s role in the JCPOA, 
most notably its commitment to multilateralism and to diplomatic dialogue. These 
values are the result of the EU’s experience of integration and are an expression of its 
identity as an actor in the international system. 
 
The newspaper analysis provided quantitative data as to the image the EU 
presents in the international system. Most significantly, the press study showed the 
increasing importance given to the EU as an actor throughout the years. It also 
revealed a trend across the three newspapers that presented the EU as the solution to 
the gap left by the US after its withdrawal from the JCPOA. Finally, the press study 
allowed to gain insights into the perceived importance of the JCPOA outside decision-
makers circles.  
 
The expert interviews provided qualitative data for the assessment of EU foreign 
policy identity. They explained the key components behind the EU’s foreign policy 
identity in its engagement with Iran. These insights into the perception of policy makers 
allowed to gain a better grasp on the prioritisation of EU values. It also made clear how 
exceptional not only the context for the EU engaging Iran was but also the tailored 
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nature of EU foreign policy tools for this task. For example, the E3 lead group model, 
which allowed the EU to have a rapid reaction once Iran’s uranium enrichment was 
announced in 2003, sought an aligned foreign policy position following the division 
caused by the intervention in Iraq. Moreover, the EU used all of the foreign policy tools 
at its disposal on the Iran file. If military intervention had been opted for, the EU would 
not have been able to exercise any influence on the question. This is to say that the 
EU’s effectiveness in engaging with Iran might be difficult to replicate on other foreign 
policy issues.  
 
Nevertheless, the foreign policy identity expressed by the EU in its engagement 
with Iran and the nuclear file indicate the capacity of the EU to fulfil a role distinct from 
that of its member states in the international system. Going forward, facing US 
withdrawal and the re-imposition of extraterritorial sanctions on European companies 
trying to work and invest in Iran, the EU’s foreign policy identity as guarantor of the 
rules-based international order will continue to be questioned. To truly tackle this 
challenge, the EU will have to work on asserting its economic independence from the 
US-dominated financial system. Preserving the JCPOA has alerted the EU as to the limits 
of its economic power and it must now seek more long-term strategies on 
internationalising its own financial system. Initiatives like the E3’s INSTEX, the special 
purpose vehicle meant to circumvent US sanctions by trading goods for goods, are a 
first step in this direction. However, the results of this policy will be slow to come, and in 
the meantime, Tehran must continue to sell the deal at home whilst facing rampant 
inflation and unemployment. So far, the Iranian government has shown no signs of 
wanting to leave the JCPOA but as discontent grows, the government will have a 
harder time silencing its hardliners. The EU will have to continue investing in Iran and 
prove to Tehran that it is to its benefit to remain in the JCPOA and on the right side of 
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